Report contents
At a glance
- Keysight sells test-and-measurement instruments, PathWave software and calibration services into customers' R&D and capital budgets, where accuracy and workflow familiarity support gross margins above 60%. The advantage is real but not lock-in: labs re-evaluate on each design cycle, and Chinese vendors and modular rivals press mid-range sockets.
- Operating cash flow exceeded net income in each of FY2022 to FY2025, at 1.02x to 1.72x, and free cash flow was positive every year at $0.90 billion to $1.28 billion; at July 31, 2026, cash of $2.60 billion roughly matched $2.57 billion of debt. The weak spot is capital allocation: goodwill rose to $3.46 billion, 53% of equity, while FY2025 ROE fell to 15.4% from 24.0% in FY2023.
Business model
Business model: measurement sold into other companies' R&D budgets
Keysight sells the instruments engineers use to prove a number is right. Its portfolio runs from oscilloscopes, signal generators and spectrum and vector network analyzers to protocol and bit-error-rate testers, plus the PathWave software that automates them and calibration, repair and training services tied to the installed base. The buyer is a specific budget holder rather than a broad industry: a network-equipment maker qualifying 800G and 1.6T optical links, a chipmaker characterizing silicon, an aerospace or defense prime certifying radar and satellite payloads, an automotive team validating battery and driver-assistance electronics, a university or government lab. Most revenue moves through Keysight's own direct sales force, with distributors covering smaller accounts and emerging markets. Payment is hardware upfront, then a smaller recurring stream of software licenses, support contracts and billable calibration.
Two segments, one cyclical hinge
That makes Keysight a manufacturer of high-value capital equipment with a service tail. It is not a subscription business, and unlike semiconductor test it has no consumable refill: an instrument stays in service for the better part of a decade, so growth requires winning each new design cycle, fab and program. The company reports two segments, Communications Solutions Group and Electronic Industrial Solutions Group, and it is mature and cyclical. Revenue peaked at roughly $5.5 billion in fiscal 2023 and declined in fiscal 2024 as carrier and network-equipment spending cooled, which is the pattern to keep in mind for everything else here.
The profit pool sits in the hardware, where gross margin has held near 60%, but the recurring tail matters more for durability than for size. Calibration contracts and software support give Keysight a reason to be inside a lab between purchases and make the next purchase easier to justify. Keysight does not disclose software or service revenue as separate lines, so the scale of that tail, and whether it is growing faster than hardware, cannot be verified from filings. Segment orders are the cleanest forward read the company publishes.
Narrower bargaining power than the margin implies
The instrument is a small line item inside a large program: a few hundred thousand dollars of test gear against a program worth many times that. Price rarely decides the sale outright, because the equipment determines whether a measurement is trusted, and buyers specify on accuracy, calibration traceability and workflow familiarity. Switching costs are real once a lab standardizes, but they are not lock-in. Every new program is a fresh decision, and the incumbency advantage resets with each generation of the standard.
Competition is concentrated and competent. Rohde & Schwarz is the closest match in wireless and RF, Anritsu is strong in field and transport test, Tektronix under Fortive and Emerson's NI compete in general-purpose instrumentation, and Advantest and Teradyne dominate volume semiconductor test. Chinese vendors compete hardest in mid-range instruments in their home market, where state tenders reward local supply. That is where a 60% gross margin is most exposed, because mid-range volume is what fills the factory and covers the engineering budget.
What makes the model fragile
Demand is derived, and that is the main source of volatility. Keysight's orders move with customers' research and capital budgets, which swing harder than GDP, and single defense or semiconductor bookings large enough to shift a quarter can also slip a quarter. A heavy fixed cost base, with research and development running near a fifth of revenue and a large direct sales organization, turns a modest revenue decline into a much larger earnings decline. Geographic and regulatory concentration add to it: China is a major market, and US export controls on advanced semiconductor and defense technology reach test equipment, so some shipments depend on licenses that can be granted, delayed or refused.
Disclosure limits how far any of this can be checked. Keysight reports orders by segment and revenue by geography, but not revenue by end market within each segment, and no customer concentration large enough to name. The AI data center story is described on calls without a dollar figure attached, so its contribution rests on inference from orders and segment commentary.
Two developments would change the read. If AI data center builds become a broad, multi-year replacement cycle in test benches rather than a narrow optical-networking sliver, "mature cyclical" understates the runway. If Chinese vendors win mid-range sockets at scale, or Keysight cuts price to hold share, the gross margin stops being evidence of pricing power and starts looking like a level rivals can attack. Segment orders carry both signals, because they turn before revenue does.
Questions worth following
- Are AI data center buildouts enough to restart commercial communications orders?
Commercial communications is Keysight's largest end market and the one that drove the last downcycle. If AI networking test demand is broad enough to lift segment orders, the revenue base gains a second leg; if it stays confined to a few optical programs, recovery still rests on carrier capex returning.
- Will modular and Chinese instruments erode Keysight's core franchise?
Book-to-bill and rival launches show whether customers still pay for the performance tier or shift to modular and lower-cost instruments. Persistent share loss at the volume end would cap revenue growth and compress gross margin even after customer R&D budgets recover.
- Will automotive and semiconductor test demand lift the industrial segment?
Electronic Industrial Solutions is the smaller segment but the one most exposed to fab construction and electric-vehicle programs. A durable recovery there would broaden revenue beyond telecom capex and reduce the order volatility that has driven the last two downcycles.
Financial quality
Financial quality: cash conversion holds, acquisition returns lag
Keysight's reported profit is cash-backed and the balance sheet carries little financial risk. The weak spot is what the company has done with the cash. Between FY2023 and FY2025, invested capital rose from roughly $4.0 billion to $6.6 billion while EBIT fell from $1.44 billion to $1.15 billion. ROE dropped from 28.3% in FY2022 to 12.6% in FY2024 and recovered only to 15.4% in FY2025, and leverage was not the cause: total liabilities never exceeded 24% of assets in any year shown.
Cash conversion is the strongest part of the record
Operating cash flow beat net income in each of the last five fiscal years, from 1.02x in FY2022 to 1.72x in FY2024, and free cash flow was positive every year, between $0.90 billion and $1.28 billion. Capex ran 2.4%–3.7% of revenue and net PP&E stayed under $1 billion through FY2023, so FCF tracks operating cash flow closely. The first nine months of FY2026 continued the pattern: $1.38 billion of operating cash flow against $1.03 billion of net income.
Working capital supports that reading. Inventory has held near $1.05 billion for six quarters while quarterly revenue climbed from $1.35 billion to $1.85 billion, and quarterly inventory turns improved from about 0.48 to 0.60. Receivable days lengthened from roughly 55 in FY2022 to 71 in FY2024, then eased to 66 in FY2025. Receivables of $1.07 billion at the July 2026 quarter-end were the highest in the series, which bears watching but still tracks the larger revenue base.
Returns fell because capital grew, not because borrowing rose
Goodwill rose $0.75 billion in FY2024 and a further $1.01 billion in the fourth quarter of FY2025, when investing cash outflow reached $1.63 billion. That is where the capital went. FY2025 free cash flow of $1.28 billion deducts only $0.13 billion of capex and ignores the $1.73 billion investing outflow, so the FCF line overstates what is available to shareholders in a deal year. An estimate built from reported figures puts FY2025 ROIC near 14%, against roughly 28% in FY2023, when invested capital was about $4.0 billion and EBIT $1.44 billion. Goodwill now equals 53% of equity.
Asset turnover tells the same arithmetic from a different angle: 0.68 in FY2022, 0.52 in FY2025. A larger balance sheet against flat revenue does that. The ratio needs to climb for the deals to look worthwhile.
FY2026 improves, with help from a weak base and the tax line
Nine-month revenue of $5.17 billion is up 31% from $3.96 billion a year earlier, and gross margin reached 65.9% in the July 2026 quarter from 61.7% a year before. The comparison base was soft, and the reported revenue line does not separate volume from the contribution of the business acquired in late FY2025. What is visible is operating leverage: gross margin fell 2.5 points between FY2023 and FY2025 as revenue dropped 8%, then rebounded above the FY2023 level at higher volume. Quarterly operating margin moved from 15.6% in January 2026 to 24.9% in July 2026.
Net margin shows the same swing with one distortion. The nine-month net margin of 19.9% includes an $80 million tax benefit in the first quarter of FY2026, when the tax line turned negative against pretax income of roughly $200 million (EBIT less interest expense). Without it, the margin is closer to 18%, above FY2025's 15.7% and below FY2022's 20.7%.
Two things to check
Goodwill at $3.46 billion is 29% of total assets, and annual depreciation and amortization of about $0.28 billion means little of it is being written down through the income statement. An impairment would arrive as a discrete charge. If instrument demand softens before the acquired businesses ramp, the FY2024–25 additions are where to look.
The debt profile also shifted: $0.75 billion moved into current liabilities in the second quarter of FY2026, taking the current ratio to 1.90 from 2.35 at FY2025 year-end before a recovery to 2.02. Cash of $2.60 billion against $2.57 billion of total debt leaves net debt near zero, and interest expense of about $0.10 billion a year against $1.15 billion of FY2025 EBIT covers comfortably. A stretch in which free cash flow stops covering deal spending while goodwill keeps climbing would change that read.
Fiscal years end October 31. USD bn unless noted.
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Q3 FY2026 | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 4.94 | 5.42 | 5.46 | 4.98 | 5.38 | 1.85 | Adequate; flat five-year record, rebounding |
| Gross margin % | 62.1 | 63.7 | 64.6 | 62.9 | 62.1 | 65.9 | Exceptional level; 2.5-pt dip recovered |
| Operating margin % | 21.9 | 20.7 | 24.9 | 16.7 | 17.7 | 24.9 | Adequate; cyclical, not structural |
| Net margin % | 18.1 | 20.7 | 19.3 | 12.3 | 15.7 | 21.5 | Strong; tax benefit flatters FY2026 |
| ROE % | 25.3 | 28.3 | 24.0 | 12.6 | 15.4 | 6.2 | Adequate; earnings-driven, not leverage |
| ROA % | 11.9 | 14.2 | 12.6 | 6.8 | 8.2 | 3.4 | Adequate |
| Operating cash flow | 1.32 | 1.14 | 1.41 | 1.05 | 1.41 | 0.44 | Strong |
| Free cash flow | 1.15 | 0.96 | 1.21 | 0.90 | 1.28 | 0.40 | Strong, but excludes deal spending |
| OCF / net income (x) | 1.48 | 1.02 | 1.33 | 1.72 | 1.66 | 1.10 | Exceptional |
| Capex / revenue % | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.2 | Asset-light |
| Liabilities / assets % | 23.5 | 22.6 | 21.1 | 19.8 | 22.9 | 21.6 | Strong |
| Current ratio | 2.93 | 3.01 | 2.35 | 2.98 | 2.35 | 2.02 | Healthy |
| Quick ratio | 2.34 | 2.40 | 1.87 | 2.27 | 1.78 | 1.62 | Strong |
| Inventory turnover (x) | 2.41 | 2.41 | 2.10 | 1.84 | 1.97 | 0.60 | Adequate for high-mix instruments |
| Receivables turnover (x) | 6.72 | 6.61 | 5.91 | 5.14 | 5.56 | 1.77 | Adequate; days drifting higher |
| Asset turnover (x) | 0.66 | 0.68 | 0.65 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.16 | Weak; capital base outgrew revenue |
| Goodwill / equity % | 43 | 38 | 35 | 47 | 58 | 53 | Weak; impairment exposure |
*Single quarter ended July 31, 2026. Quarterly ROE, ROA and turnover figures are standalone and not comparable with full-year rows.
| Quarter | Revenue | Gross margin % | Operating margin % | Net income | OCF | Total assets | Total liabilities | Current ratio | Goodwill | Assessment | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 FY2025 (Jan 2025) | 1.30 | 63.2 | 16.9 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 9.39 | 4.20 | 2.95 | 2.35 | Adequate | Stable |
| Q2 FY2025 (Apr 2025) | 1.31 | 62.3 | 16.0 | 0.26 | 0.48 | 10.54 | 5.06 | 3.39 | 2.43 | Adequate | Stable |
| Q3 FY2025 (Jul 2025) | 1.35 | 61.7 | 17.0 | 0.19 | 0.32 | 10.65 | 4.98 | 3.59 | 2.43 | Adequate | Flat |
| Q4 FY2025 (Oct 2025) | 1.42 | 61.2 | 15.5 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 11.29 | 5.42 | 2.35 | 3.44 | Adequate | Balance sheet step-up |
| Q1 FY2026 (Jan 2026) | 1.60 | 62.2 | 15.6 | 0.28 | 0.44 | 11.48 | 5.28 | 2.60 | 3.47 | Adequate | Improving |
| Q2 FY2026 (Apr 2026) | 1.72 | 68.6 | 23.8 | 0.35 | 0.50 | 11.74 | 5.41 | 1.90 | 3.46 | Strong | Improving |
| Q3 FY2026 (Jul 2026) | 1.85 | 65.9 | 24.9 | 0.40 | 0.44 | 11.92 | 5.35 | 2.02 | 3.46 | Strong | Improving |
Seven quarters are shown because earlier single-quarter statements are not available on a comparable basis. Net PP&E is not disclosed for these periods; the last reported figure was $0.99 billion at FY2023.
Questions worth following
- Can Keysight earn its cost of capital on the FY2024–25 acquisitions?
Invested capital rose about 60% between FY2023 and FY2025 while EBIT fell, and an estimated ROIC near 14% sits well below the level the business earned three years ago. Whether the acquired businesses lift returns decides if the deals added value or only size.
- Can Keysight keep cash conversion above 1.0x through the upcycle?
Cash flow has covered net income in every recent year, which is what makes the reported earnings believable. A volume rebound can absorb cash into inventory and receivables, so the question is whether that coverage survives the recovery and not only the FY2024 downturn.
- Is Keysight's FY2026 revenue growth organic?
Nine-month revenue rose 31%, but a large acquisition closed in the fourth quarter of FY2025 and the year-earlier base was weak. Organic growth would mean the instrument franchise itself is expanding; acquisition-led growth leaves the return question unresolved and makes the margin recovery harder to read.
Generated by DeepVal AI. Data and models may contain errors or be outdated. For research only; not personalized investment advice.
Continue reading the full report
- Key risksWhat could break the investment case
- Valuation and margin of safetyWhat the current price assumes, and how much room for error it leaves
- SummaryOur overall judgement and what to watch next
Free to sign up · 20 research points · unlocking this report uses 10
20 points cover 2 full reports. No card needed.
Research reflects its generation date. Preview the first two modules.
More on Keysight Technologies Inc
Keysight Technologies Inc
Business, moat and key questions
Open company page