Report contents
Industry landscape
Where the company competes: club retail with few rivals of scale
Costco Wholesale runs membership warehouse clubs. The buildings are large and plainly fitted out, and each carries a few thousand items across food, sundries, electronics, apparel and gasoline. Members pay an annual fee for the right to shop, and merchandise is marked up thinly enough to undercut supermarkets and mass merchants on comparable goods. The fee is where the profit sits. It carries almost no incremental cost, gets reported as its own revenue line, and funds a large share of operating income. The fiscal year ended August 30, 2026, and the company filed its Form 10-K on October 7, 2026.
Upstream, Costco buys directly from manufacturers and growers, at volumes that make it one of the largest customers for many consumer-goods suppliers. Kirkland Signature, its private label, spans hundreds of categories and gives Costco a credible substitute when a brand's terms are unattractive. Goods move through Costco's own depots into clubs it owns or leases, then straight to the member. No franchisee, wholesaler or retailer sits in between. That structure matters: Costco keeps the retail margin an intermediary would take and returns most of it in price, holding onto the fee. The renewal rate, which the company reports above 90% in the United States and Canada, suggests members accept the trade.
The core market is membership warehouse-club retail, and it is not a single market. Demand is local. A club draws members from a drive-time radius, so clubs in different metropolitan areas do not compete for the same shopper. Sourcing is global. Costco therefore competes country by country, with the United States the largest block of sales by a wide margin, Canada second, and smaller operations in Mexico, the United Kingdom, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Spain, France and elsewhere. Any claim about Costco's competitive position has to be made market by market; a global total would blur real differences in who it faces.
Concentration is high where the company earns most of its money
In the United States, three chains of national scale operate clubs: Costco, Sam's Club, which Walmart owns, and BJ's Wholesale Club. Costco does not publish market share, and the filings do not contain a revenue-share estimate for the club channel, so the concentration case rests on the count of serious competitors and on how long that count has held. The format has produced no new national entrant in the United States since the early 1980s, when all three incumbents opened. That is the practical test: entry into club retail takes real estate, inventory, and a distribution network dense enough to keep costs below the incumbents', and no one has assembled that at national scale in four decades.
Elsewhere the picture is thinner. Costco often operates against no direct club rival at all, or against a single one, as the table shows.
| Market | Club-format rivals of scale |
|---|---|
| United States | Sam's Club (Walmart), BJ's Wholesale Club |
| Canada | Loblaw's wholesale club operations; Walmart exited the format in 2009 |
| Mexico | Sam's Club Mexico |
| United Kingdom | No consumer club rival of similar scale; Booker (Tesco) serves small-business customers |
| South Korea | E-Mart Traders |
| Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Spain, France | No club-format rival of comparable scale |
Barriers to entering the club format are high, which supports pricing and membership-fee growth in the countries where Costco already has density. A new entrant would need to match Costco's buying scale before it could match its prices, and it would need enough clubs in a market to make the distribution economics work. Neither is quick.
The barrier protects the club format against other club operators. It does not protect Costco against retail generally. Warehouse clubs remain a minority of US grocery and general-merchandise spending, and Costco competes for the rest of that wallet with supermarkets, discount grocers, mass merchants and Amazon. That rivalry is fragmented, which blunts any single competitor, but it also means Costco's price advantage has to be maintained continuously through buying and operating efficiency. The gasoline and food offerings pull members into the building; the fee depends on that trip continuing to feel worth making.
Two things would change this assessment. A rival building club-scale buying power in a market where Costco is currently the only operator would compress its cost advantage there. And the long-run risk sits in the entry barrier itself: if online grocery and delivery ever reduce the value of a single large shopping trip, the format's scale economics weaken for everyone in it, incumbents included. So far the evidence shows a concentrated, hard-to-enter channel in North America and a much less contested field in several international markets, with the competitive question shifting from who else runs clubs to whether the bulk shopping trip keeps its hold on the customer.
Competitive advantage
Does the company have a moat? Yes, and the returns make the case
Overall rating: Fairly Strong. Costco clears the profitability half of the moat test outright and the concentration half by inference. The two tests matter together because they separate a structural barrier from a well-run company: sustained excess returns show the advantage is not being competed away, and a stable cast of rivals shows why it has not been. Costco's returns have stayed high for five straight fiscal years, and the list of companies able to compete with it at national scale has not changed in decades. The weaker evidence is on market share, because Costco does not publish share and no third party publishes a club-channel series comparable across the three US chains. The judgment leans on returns, with industry structure as corroboration.
Market position: the largest club operator, in a cast that has not changed
Market position: Fairly Strong. Costco is the largest warehouse-club operator by revenue and is still growing faster than the format. Revenue reached $275.24 billion in fiscal 2025, ended August 31, 2025, up from $195.93 billion in fiscal 2021, a compound rate of about 8.9% a year. Through the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, the company reported revenue of $207.44 billion, up 9.7% year over year, and net income of $6.23 billion, up 13.5%.
The framework's share test calls for a five-year trend: average drift under 2 percentage points implies very strong barriers, drift above 5 points implies none. That test cannot be run here. Costco reports membership renewal rates and comparable sales but not share, and Sam's Club's results sit inside Walmart's segment reporting, so a like-for-like series for the club channel would take an outside reconstruction. What is observable is entry. No new national club chain has been built in the United States since the early 1980s, and Costco added roughly 40% to revenue between fiscal 2021 and fiscal 2025 without a new competitor taking any of it. That is consistent with a stable position. It does not establish whether Costco gained or gave up a point or two to Sam's Club over the same period, and revenue growth also reflects new clubs opening, so it is not itself a share measure.
Fairly Strong, then, because Costco is clearly the largest operator in a channel that has resisted new entry for four decades, but no auditable share series confirms how steady the lead has been.
Profitability: high-20s returns that have not drifted down
Profitability: Strong.
| Fiscal year | Revenue (USD bn) | Net income (USD bn) | Net margin (%) | Gross margin (%) | ROE (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 195.93 | 5.01 | 2.56 | 12.88 | 27.93 |
| 2022 | 226.95 | 5.84 | 2.58 | 12.15 | 30.59 |
| 2023 | 242.29 | 6.29 | 2.60 | 12.26 | 27.54 |
| 2024 | 254.45 | 7.37 | 2.90 | 12.61 | 30.27 |
| 2025 | 275.24 | 8.10 | 2.94 | 12.84 | 30.69 |
Return on equity averaged about 29% across those five years and finished at 30.7%. The reported figures do not extend back ten years, so the five-year average stands in for the longer window, and ROE substitutes for return on invested capital. The substitution is reasonable because Costco's borrowings are small next to its $29.16 billion of fiscal 2025 equity, so leverage is not doing much of the work. An estimate that applies the fiscal 2025 tax rate of roughly 25% to operating income and divides by equity plus borrowings puts after-tax ROIC in the low 20s; adding operating-lease liabilities to invested capital would pull it lower but keep it above 15%.
The direction of the returns matters more than the level. Return on assets rose from 8.72% in fiscal 2021 to 11.02% in fiscal 2025, and net margin widened from 2.56% to 2.94%. If entry barriers were thin, a leader's returns would drift toward the cost of capital as rivals copied what worked. These moved the other way.
A direct peer comparison is not available. Walmart reports Sam's Club as a segment but not club-level invested capital or membership-fee detail, so a segment ROIC cannot be calculated from filings, and BJ's Wholesale Club is far smaller. Costco's roughly 3% net margin looks thin in absolute terms, and that is the design: merchandise is marked up lightly on purpose, and the return comes from turning inventory about twelve times a year and collecting fees. A low net margin is not evidence against a moat here. Falling returns on assets, or a closing price gap against Sam's Club, would be.
Overall rating: Fairly Strong, carried by the returns
Costco rates Strong on profitability and Fairly Strong on market position, and the overall call is Fairly Strong. The decisive facts are an average ROE near 29% that has not eroded, a return on assets that has risen for five years, and a national competitor set that has not admitted a new member since the early 1980s. Weighting profitability most heavily, as the framework asks, points the same way. The gap between this rating and Strong is the absence of a measurable, stable share figure: the position looks entrenched, but the evidence confirms it through returns and entry history rather than through share data. A clear break in US and Canada renewal rates, or a well-capitalized entrant building club scale in a market where Costco now stands alone, would move the rating down.
Where the advantage comes from and how long it can last: buying volume that members pay to join
Three sources carry the weight, and they work as a set: purchasing scale with a private label attached to it, a paid membership that shapes shopping behavior, and fixed costs spread across a base no rival in the format can match. Their durability differs, and the softer of the three is the customer relationship.
Supply side: no cost secret, just buying volume — Moderate
Costco buys most merchandise directly from manufacturers and growers, in few enough items per category that each order is large. A supplier weighing Costco's terms knows that refusing removes one of its biggest outlets in that category, so Costco negotiates from volume and gets a lower unit cost than a smaller buyer would. It then passes most of that discount to members through price and keeps the membership fee as profit. Kirkland Signature is the second lever: when a brand will not move on terms, Costco can give the shelf to its own label, which also captures the manufacturing margin the brand would have taken. The label spans hundreds of categories, so the threat is credible across most of the store.
None of this is proprietary. There is no patent, no scarce input, no mineral right, no manufacturing process rivals cannot observe. Sam's Club runs Member's Mark on identical logic, and Aldi and Lidl run private label at scale in grocery. Any retailer that assembled comparable volume per item would earn comparable terms, which means the advantage lives in the cost of assembling that volume: real estate, inventory, depot capacity, and the years it takes to fill them. That is a scale barrier facing an entrant. It is not a cost edge that Costco owns. Buying scale also gives the private label its value; Kirkland's reputation is a byproduct of the price gap it protects, and as a brand on its own it would not hold the shelf.
Moderate, and no higher. The edge is real and it shows up in gross margin, which has held between 12.1% and 12.9% since fiscal 2021 while prices stayed low. But it is an advantage that capital could buy, given enough of it and enough time.
Demand side: the fee creates habit, and habit is not lock-in — Moderate
Members pay an annual fee before they shop, and the fee is refundable if they are dissatisfied. Having paid, a member has a reason to concentrate purchases there rather than spread them, which lifts visit frequency and basket size. Renewal above 90% in the United States and Canada, which the company reports, is the visible result. There is also a search-cost effect: comparing value across a few thousand items is far easier than across a supermarket's tens of thousands, so members do less price checking per trip.
The hold is weaker than it first appears. Switching costs are close to zero. A household can shop Costco, a supermarket, and Amazon in the same week and still renew; there is no contract, no data lock-in, no retraining, and the fee is small against annual grocery spending. The pricing power that exists is also capped from within, because the model promises low prices and a large increase would undercut the reason to renew. Costco does not disclose churn by cohort, region, or tenure, so the durability of the habit is inferred from one aggregate renewal rate rather than measured across the member base. That rate is the single best early warning: a material decline, as opposed to a point of drift, would be the first credible sign that the behavioral hold is weakening.
Moderate. Members are attached, but they are not captured.
Economies of scale: the strongest of the three — Fairly Strong
The club format carries heavy fixed costs per market. Land and buildings, a depot network, a truck fleet, buying and information-technology organizations, and corporate overhead all have to be in place before a single club opens, and a new operator must reach enough density in a metropolitan area for depot runs to be full. It must do that while matching prices set by an incumbent whose buying costs are lower, which means losing money until it reaches volume it may never reach. Costco runs those fixed costs across $275.24 billion of revenue; a rival at a fraction of that carries the same functions on a smaller base.
Working capital works the same way. Inventory turned about 12.6 times in fiscal 2024, roughly 29 days on hand, receivables are negligible because members pay at the register, and the annual fee is collected before the year it covers. Current liabilities exceeded current assets that year, $35.46 billion against $34.25 billion, which is what a business financed by its suppliers and its members looks like. Larger scale buys better payment terms and lower unit costs on freight, fixtures, and supplies, and those savings feed back into the price gap.
Scale on its own is a weak barrier in the framework, because a new entrant can build volume too. Here the entrant has to match the price first, out of a cost base that does not yet support it, while members are already renewing elsewhere. That pairing of scale with member habit is the strongest combination the framework recognizes, and Costco has both elements, with the habit the weaker of the two.
Durability: the substitute that matters is the shopping trip, not a rival chain
Costco's real substitutes are supermarkets, discount grocers, mass merchants, Amazon, and grocery delivery, not another club operator. For packaged goods and fresh food, the member price is usually the lower one, which limits how far customers migrate if Costco nudges prices. For electronics and apparel, competition is closer and Costco's presence in those categories is small, so a price rise there would cost volume.
The sharper threat is to the trip itself. If households shift staple buying toward smaller, more frequent orders and delivery, the economics of a warehouse run weaken for every club operator at once. That would not open the door to a new entrant; it would shrink the pool the incumbent's fixed costs are spread across. The recent evidence shows no erosion yet: revenue grew 9.7% in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, above the 8.9% compound rate of fiscal 2021 to fiscal 2025, and net income grew faster. That is a statement about growth, not proof that the bulk trip is safe.
What would change the assessment: a funded entrant building club scale in a market where Costco currently stands alone, a material fall in renewal rates rather than a point of drift, or evidence that delivery is taking the routine staple purchase. Barriers here are economic, not legal, so they can be bought if the prize looks large enough. On present evidence the moat protects today's returns for several more years, and its soft spot is the membership relationship, which is behavioral and visible only through one aggregate renewal figure.
Generated by DeepVal AI. Data and models may contain errors or be outdated. For research only; not personalized investment advice.
Continue reading the full report
- Comparison and summaryHow Costco Wholesale Corp compares with its closest rivals, and our moat rating
Free to sign up · 20 research points · unlocking this report uses 10
20 points cover 2 full reports. No card needed.
Research reflects its generation date. Preview the first two modules.
More on Costco Wholesale Corp
Costco Wholesale Corp
Business, moat and key questions
Open company page