Baker Hughes (BKR) · Deep analysis

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At a glance

  • Business model: Baker Hughes sells and services oilfield and gas equipment — turbines, compressors, LNG liquefaction — through OFSE, which bills work tied to customer budgets, and IET, which books multi-year orders and then services the installed base. Backlog anchors the next few years, but fixed-price awards and a short LNG buyer list carry the execution risk.
  • Financial quality: Cash conversion is steady; operating cash flow was positive every year FY2021–FY2025 and covered net income, with FY2025 free cash flow of $2.54bn and first-half FY2026 FCF of $1.20bn. Balance-sheet capacity is less clear, since a $9.52bn financing inflow lifted cash to $15.73bn but also liabilities to 61.8% of assets, while about $691m of first-half nonoperating income flattered earnings.
01

Business model

I. Business model: LNG equipment orders, an aftermarket annuity, and an oilfield service cycle

Baker Hughes sells equipment, services, and technology to the companies that find, move, liquefy, and process hydrocarbons, plus a growing set of industrial and power customers. The buyers are national oil companies (NOCs) — state-owned producers heavily concentrated in the Middle East — international oil companies, engineering and construction (EPC) firms building LNG plants, and industrial operators. It gets paid three ways: equipment sales, multi-year service and spare-parts contracts, and software subscriptions. This is a capital-equipment manufacturer with a service annuity attached, not a subscription business. The oilfield service side sits mid-cycle and cyclical; the LNG and industrial equipment side is in an expansion phase.

Two segments, two different revenue clocks

Recent filings describe two reporting segments: Oilfield Services & Equipment (OFSE) and Industrial & Energy Technology (IET). OFSE rents tools, evaluates formations, and supplies completions and artificial lift, billed by the day or by the job. IET sells gas turbines, compressors, and LNG liquefaction equipment, then services what it installs.

The direct cause of the difference is timing: OFSE revenue moves within quarters as customers change drilling programs, while IET revenue arrives years after the order. The structural cause is that the two segments sit on opposite sides of the customer's capital cycle. Service spending is operating expense a customer can cut in a budget meeting; an LNG train is a capital project approved after years of engineering, with a 20-to-30-year operating life. That is why IET revenue lags orders while OFSE revenue leads budgets, and why the same oil price produces very different results in each segment.

Backlog is the real asset; fixed pricing is the real risk

Backlog — the disclosed value of work won but not yet delivered — is the most useful number for judging the next three years. In a strong quarter, LNG order intake can exceed the revenue that quarter produces. Structurally, global LNG capacity is added in waves tied to a handful of projects and a handful of buyers, so intake is lumpy and concentrated rather than smooth.

The tradeoff is order intake versus execution. Chasing awards builds backlog and locks in decades of spare-parts and service revenue, but large equipment packages are usually bid at fixed prices: the seller absorbs cost inflation between award and delivery. A project that slips spends money before it earns any. Management can grow the backlog quickly by bidding aggressively; whether that converts into earnings depends on disciplines that only show up in segment margin, years later.

Bargaining power is weak at the front end and stronger at the back

NOCs and EPC contractors run competitive tenders, and only a few vendors can deliver LNG-scale equipment on schedule. That scarcity supports pricing. But on any single project the buyer is larger than the seller, and awards tend to go to whoever accepts the tightest terms. Once a turbine or compressor is installed, switching service providers is expensive, so spare parts and field service carry better economics and stickier demand. Front-end margins on new equipment therefore matter less than the installed base they create — and that service tail takes years to arrive, and only if the equipment was actually delivered on time.

What the evidence covers, and what it does not

The FY2025 Form 10-K filed February 5, 2026 is the current annual source. Its cover page confirms fiscal year 2025, large-accelerated-filer status, 988,236,510 Class A shares outstanding as of January 27, 2026, and $37.7 billion of aggregate market value in non-affiliate voting stock at June 30, 2025. It carries no segment revenue, geographic mix, backlog, or customer concentration. Those tables sit in the body of that filing and in quarterly reports, so treat the segment descriptions above as structure to verify, not as reported figures.

Geographic mix deserves that check more than it would at most industrials. A Middle East-weighted customer base supports LNG-linked orders but concentrates receivables and payment timing with state buyers, which pressures working capital well before it pressures the income statement.

What would overturn the read: if IET margins hold or expand while backlog grows, execution is under control and the order-driven model is doing what it promises. If backlog grows while IET margins compress, Baker Hughes is buying revenue, and the service annuity the backlog implies is further away than the headline number suggests.

Questions worth following

  • Can Baker Hughes convert its LNG equipment backlog into revenue without fixed-price execution losses?

    Execution on large fixed-price equipment packages decides whether order growth becomes profit or a charge. If IET delivers on schedule and holds segment margin, the expansion case strengthens; if it does not, a growing backlog is a liability rather than an asset.

  • Will international and offshore service demand offset weaker North American oilfield activity?

    Geographic mix decides whether OFSE revenue grows or shrinks when North American spending falls. The answer changes segment earnings, capital allocated to international fleets, and how much of total profit depends on LNG equipment orders instead of field activity.

  • Is the industrial and energy technology mix large enough to break Baker Hughes' link to oilfield spending?

    If IET serves a genuinely different customer base, total earnings should hold up better when oilfield activity falls, which changes how the whole company is valued. If its industrial demand is really oil-and-gas-driven, Baker Hughes remains a cyclical equipment supplier.

02

Financial quality

Financial quality: dependable cash, a rebuilt balance sheet, a thinner earnings base

Baker Hughes sells long-cycle equipment and field services into oil and gas: turbines and compressors, subsea systems, chemicals, completions. Revenue is billed against project milestones and service contracts, so utilization and working capital explain more of the outcome than pricing does. Through fiscal 2025 the record was improving but unremarkable. In the first half of 2026, the balance sheet changed far more than the income statement.

Five years: thin margins, dependable cash

Fiscal years end December 31. Figures in USD bn unless noted.

MetricFY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025Q2 FY2026 (quarter)Assessment
Revenue20.5021.1625.5127.8327.736.74Adequate
Gross margin (%)22.123.420.623.323.623.4Adequate
Net margin (%)-1.1-2.87.610.79.310.1Adequate
ROE (%)-1.6-4.113.118.514.54.0 (quarter, not annualized)Strong, on thin equity
Current ratio1.651.321.251.32Not disclosedNot disclosedAdequate but thin
Liabilities / assets (%)52.557.558.055.553.561.8Adequate, deteriorating
Operating cash flow2.371.893.063.333.811.34Strong
Free cash flow1.831.123.06(a)2.052.541.04Strong
Operating cash flow / net incomen/mn/m1.581.121.47n/mStrong

(a) FY2023 free cash flow equals operating cash flow exactly, implying no capex — inconsistent with every other year and best treated as a data artifact. FY2025 gross margin and ROE are computed (gross profit ÷ revenue; net income ÷ average equity) because the provider series stops at FY2024. The provider's own gross-margin figures for FY2021, FY2022 and FY2024 run two to three points below gross profit ÷ revenue, so read the margin level as roughly 20–24%.

Revenue recovered 35% between FY2021 and FY2025, but FY2025 was flat at -0.4%, and Q2 2026 came in below the same quarter a year earlier ($6.74bn against $6.91bn). Nearly all of the profit improvement came from margin, not volume. The cash record is steadier: operating cash flow was positive in all five years, including the two loss years, when the deficits were non-cash rather than cash drains.

Six quarters: one quarter did most of the work

Single-quarter figures, USD bn.

MetricQ1 FY25Q2 FY25Q3 FY25Q4 FY25Q1 FY26Q2 FY26AssessmentTrend
Revenue6.436.917.017.396.596.74AdequateFlat
Operating income0.750.890.950.970.810.85AdequateFlat
Net income0.400.700.610.880.930.68AdequateAided by nonoperating income
Total assets38.1138.7439.2340.8850.9052.62WeakStep change
Total liabilities20.9020.8720.9121.8731.4132.54WeakRising
Cash3.283.092.693.7114.7615.73AdequateDebt-funded
Operating cash flow0.710.510.931.660.501.34StrongSeasonal
Free cash flow0.410.210.631.280.161.04StrongLumpy

Net PP&E is disclosed only for FY2022 ($4.5bn), so fixed assets are omitted; inventory ($5.1bn) and net receivables ($6.5bn) were last reported at Q2 FY2025.

Between December 2025 and March 2026, total liabilities rose from $21.9bn to $31.4bn and cash rose from $3.7bn to $14.8bn on a $9.5bn financing inflow. Equity moved $0.5bn. Liabilities are 61.8% of assets at June 30, 2026, against 53.5% at year-end 2025. Long-term debt is not broken out in the supplied data after mid-2025, so the composition has to come from the filing. The third-quarter 2026 Form 10-Q, which falls outside the periods above, reports revenue of $8.0bn against $7.0bn a year earlier, so the Q2 dip may not be a trend.

The relationships that decide how good 2026 earnings are

Nonoperating income is carrying much of the profit. First-half net income of $1.61bn compares with operating income of $1.66bn, and the nine-month 2026 filing shows other income, net of $534m. With $157m of expense in the third quarter, that implies roughly $691m of income in the first half. Investing cash flow of +$1.04bn in Q1 2026 is consistent with disposals. Operating cash flow ($1.84bn in the first half) is the cleaner read on the business than net income. The same filing points the other way for GAAP earnings: amortization of acquired intangibles was $165m in Q3 2026 against $10m a year earlier, so a larger non-cash charge is now embedded.

The financing turned ROE into a leverage question. Equity grew about 6% while liabilities grew roughly 49% between December 2025 and June 2026. FY2024's 18.5% ROE was earned on a 55% liabilities-to-assets base; at 61.8%, the same return requires the new capital to earn something. If the cash is a bridge to a transaction, its cost is temporary. If it sits, the company is paying note-level coupons — the filing lists senior notes from 3.2% to 5.1% — to hold $15.7bn in cash. Interest expense, net was $177m in Q3 2026 against $56m a year earlier.

Margin, not volume, is doing the work — and margin is the cyclical part. Net margin went from -2.8% in FY2022 to 10.7% in FY2024 and has stayed near 9–10% since. Inventory turns improved modestly (4.36 in FY2024 from 4.18) with no visible build. The cash discipline has held through a down cycle, which looks structural; the margin expansion tracks the oil and gas capital cycle and mix, which is not. If quarterly revenue stays near $6.7bn, holding 10% net margin depends on cost control and on the acquired business contributing.

Returns rest on a small equity base and $5.6bn of goodwill. Asset turnover has run about 0.7, ordinary for capital-heavy equipment, so 13–18% ROE comes more from thin equity than from asset productivity. Goodwill of $5.57bn at June 30, 2026 is roughly 28% of equity, and amortization is rising. Those returns need to improve to justify it.

What to check
  • What produced the roughly $691m of first-half nonoperating income, whether gains of that size recur, and where the proceeds went. If other income keeps filling the gap between operating and net income, the quality of 2026 earnings is weaker than the headline.
  • The $9.5bn financing: maturity schedule, coupons, and whether the cash is committed to a transaction. Short-term debt is only $0.77bn, so the remainder is presumably longer-dated, but the supplied data does not break it out.
  • Receivables: FY2024 revenue over net receivables of about 3.9x implies roughly 93 days outstanding, long for oilfield services and consistent with milestone and retention billing. Collections have not been observable in the supplied data since mid-2025; the latest balance sheet needs checking for a build in receivables or contract assets.
  • Goodwill and the equity base: $5.57bn of goodwill against $19.9bn of equity, with intangible amortization rising sharply. A shortfall in the acquired business's returns would pressure both the carrying value and reported ROE.

Generated by DeepVal AI. Data and models may contain errors or be outdated. For research only; not personalized investment advice.

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